



**WEAVER  
AND  
TIDWELL**

*L.L.P.*

CERTIFIED PUBLIC  
ACCOUNTANTS  
AND CONSULTANTS

March 16, 2009

To the Honorable County Judge and Commissioners' Court of  
Tarrant County, Texas

We have audited the financial statements of the governmental activities, the business-type activities, the aggregate discretely presented component units, each major fund, and the aggregate remaining fund information of Tarrant County, Texas (the County) for the year ended September 30, 2008, and have issued our report thereon dated March 16, 2009. Our opinions on the financial statements and this report, insofar as they relate to discretely presented component units are based solely on the report of other auditors. In planning and performing our audit of the basic financial statements of the County as of and for the year ended September 30, 2008, in accordance with auditing standards generally accepted in the United States of America, we considered the County's internal control over financial reporting (internal control) as a basis for designing our auditing procedures for the purpose of expressing our opinions on the financial statements, but not for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the effectiveness of the County's internal control. Accordingly, we do not express an opinion on the effectiveness of the Governmental Unit's internal control.

A control deficiency exists when the design or operation of a control does not allow management or employees, in the normal course of performing their assigned functions, to prevent or detect misstatements on a timely basis. A significant deficiency is a control deficiency, or a combination of control deficiencies, that adversely affects the entity's ability to initiate, authorize, record, process, or report financial data reliably in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles such that there is more than a remote likelihood that a misstatement of the entity's financial statements that is more than inconsequential will not be prevented or detected by the entity's internal control.

A material weakness is a significant deficiency, or a combination of significant deficiencies, that results in more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of the financial statements will not be prevented or detected by the entity's internal control.

Our consideration of internal control was for the limited purpose described in the first paragraph and would not necessarily identify all deficiencies in internal control that might be significant deficiencies or material weaknesses. We did not identify any deficiencies in internal control that we consider to be material weaknesses or significant deficiencies.

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However, we noted certain matters involving the internal control and its operation that we believe can be improved to increase the operating efficiency of the County. The following matters are presented for your consideration.

### **IT Operations**

*Observation:* Unauthorized or undetected accounts may be used to access the system resulting in loss of critical data or the illicit manipulation of financial information.

*Recommendation:* Management should have a procedure in place to generate and review the listing of users with Active Directory access.

*Response:* As soon as funding is available we will migrate to an Active Directory 2008 structure. This will allow a more granular and structured environment to review accounts. The new environment is equitable to a process that is in the works for monthly monitoring of unused accounts. In addition, IT Security does weekly reviews of AD accounts to verify accountability.

*Observation:* There are no documented periodic user access reviews being performed for Active Directory or SAP.

*Recommendations:* Management should ensure a timely periodic user access review occurs for all critical applications and any user updates (additions, permission changes, terminations, etc.), and sign offs and timestamps should be appropriately and clearly documented.

Management should also ensure any corrective action taken as a result of the review (i.e. removal or addition of access) is clearly noted and retained as evidence. The review should be conducted to ensure current users, including administrators, are appropriately restricted at least annually.

*Response:* We believe that since access is so closely tied to employee data, an account has absolutely no access once HR removes the employee from active status. From another angle, we must supply license information to SAP annually which is expensive. We strive to deactivate unnecessary accounts so that we are not paying for additional licensing. However, we feel that we can have an annual process to verify the accounts. Peregrine tickets are created for all changes in permissions and level of access for each case.

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*Observation:* There are no documented periodic access reviews of roles being performed for SAP to ensure that job duties are consistent with access granted.

*Recommendation:* Management should ensure roles are reviewed at least annually to ensure consistency and to avoid segregation of duties conflicts.

*Response:* SAP role access is not only a security function; it is a combined Core Competency Center and process-owner function. Generally, one of security's partners has the final vote on job duty and permission. We attempt to limit all system roles to a least-permission status, although Basis has a hand in some of this so it will always be a fragmented area

*Observation:* The SAP\* ID was found to be unlocked when inspecting the listing of super (powerful) users.

*Recommendation:* Management should lock (deactivate) SAP\* and replace with a new super user. In the SAP\* user master record, the following should be performed:

- Create a user master record for SAP\* in all new clients and in client 066.
- Assign a new password to SAP\* in clients 000 and 001.
- Delete all profiles from the SAP\* profile list so that it has no authorizations.

*Response:* The SAP\* ID has been locked, and all recommendations regarding this observation have been fully implemented.

*Observation:* Business recovery tests are not being conducted or reviewed by management periodically. The latest test was performed in 2003 and the disaster recovery plan ("DRP") has expired and the previous contract in place for the testing has expired.

*Recommendation:* Business recovery tests should be conducted periodically and the DRP should be updated and management should ensure valid contracts exist.

*Response:* We will be adding one staff position whose primary job will be to proactively test and validate our backup and recovery processes. We are also

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working on updating the disaster recovery plan. Our goal is to have the current plan documented and approved in FY10.

**Cash Disbursements**

*Observation:* It was noted that the document being signed by the Assistant County Auditor to approve checks between \$10,000 and \$50,000 was being discarded.

*Recommendation:* This provides an added measure of control over cash disbursements and we recommend that this document be retained.

*Response:* The signature document is now scanned and filed.

This communication is intended solely for the information and use of management, Commissioners' Court, district judges, and management of the County, and is not intended to be and should not be used by anyone other than these specified parties.

Yours truly,

*Weaver and Tidwell, L.L.P.*

WEAVER AND TIDWELL, L.L.P.

BKJ:plh